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Abstract
Although several semi-arid African countries are decentralizing water services and attempting to increase the participation of local
actors in water resource management, how effectively this is working, and whether it is improving water access, is not yet well
researched. Little attention has been paid to the capacities (in terms of knowledge and resources) that local actors need to successfully
influence the operation and management of water services they are made responsible for. In a qualitative study, we asked regional and
local actors in the Omusati Region of north-central Namibia for their perspectives on how water reforms, initiated in the late 1990s,
have impacted on their participation in water governance. Our analysis reveals that decentralized governance of water resources can be
ineffective if governments do not allocate sufficient resources to support and enable local actors to participate efficiently and effectively
in the governance system. In the context of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals, achieving greater equity and
efficiency in the water sector while reducing climate risk will require that local actors receive more support in return for fuller andmore
effective participation. We suggest that policy and practice around decentralized water governance pay more attention to building the
capacities of local actors to absorb the responsibilities transferred to them.
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Introduction
Policy documents and scientific discussions increasingly cite lo-
cal public participation as central to effective water management.
These documents and discussions focus on how local participa-
tion encourages diverse perspectives, thus strengthening context-
specific responses and ensuring an equitable spread of benefits
across different social groups (Adhikari and Tarkowski 2013;
Carr et al. 2012; Cosens and Chaffin 2016; Pahl-Wostl 2002).
As a hybrid form of governance that enables communities to play
a central role in managing water resources, the decentralized
governance of water resources actively encourages local partici-
pation (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014) and assumes this will
yield more equitable outcomes (Brown 2011). In practice, how-
ever, decentralization has seldom improved or expanded local
participation in relation to water governance (Gupta et al. 2013;
Mapedza et al. 2016; Ziervogel et al. 2019).
In southern Africa, community-based management of nat-
ural resources has expanded in line with governments’ stated
intentions of increasing local participation and ownership
(Shackleton et al. 2002). This includes the establishment of
local-level water management institutions (Hossain and Helao
2008). However, the capacities of local actors to contribute
meaningfully to decentralized water management, as well as
the presence of enabling institutional arrangements and finan-
cial resources, tend to be limited (Faguet 2003).
Since 1997, the Namibian government has delegated owner-
ship and responsibility for managing village-level water re-
sources to local communities via what they call basin-
management committees (BMCs), water users’ associations
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(WUAs), and water-point committees (WPCs) (Remmert 2016).
In this paper, we aim to assess the extent to which these reforms
have supported water decentralization and inclusive water
governance.
We begin by defining how the concepts of local capacity,
participation, and decentralized water governance frame the re-
search. After outlining our research methods, we reflect on the
nature and extent of village-level participation in water gover-
nance in three villages in Onesi Constituency, which is located in
theOmusati Region of Namibia. Our findings focus on the cross-
scalar institutional support enabling local participation in water
governance. The discussion then highlights how the capacity of
local actors needs to be better supported to enable meaningful
participation in water governance. This requires an understand-
ing of the resource, institutional, and governance contexts that
contribute to how participation is enacted. In conclusion, we
argue that without a clear understanding of the capacities of the
local-level actors to play their roles in decentralized water gov-
ernance, the benefits of decentralization can be overstated.
Local capacity and decentralized water
governance
In exploring the extent to which decentralizing the manage-
ment of water-services increases opportunities for local par-
ticipation, the concepts of decentralized water governance,
local capacity, and participation are central. In this section,
we define how these terms are used in this paper.
Water governance is about who does what, when, and how
(Moench et al. 2003). It encompasses rules and practices as well
as the political, institutional, and administrative processes (both
formal and informal) through which actors articulate their inter-
ests, air their concerns, take and implement decisions, and are
held accountable for the development and management of water
resources and for the delivery of services (Bakker and Munk
Centre Program on Water Issues 2003; OECD (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development) 2011).
Since the mid-1990s, the governments of many African
countries have decentralized the governance of water re-
sources in the expectation that this will expand local partici-
pation and make water management more effective (Ferguson
and Mulwafu 2001; Poteete and Ribot 2011). That is, some of
the power and resources involved in planning plan and man-
aging water assets have been transferred away from the central
government to the regional and municipal levels to try to en-
sure that policies can be tailored to respond to local needs
(Nikolov 2006; Rondinelli et al. 1983). This decentralization
was expected to bring decision-makers and local communities
into closer contact and empower local actors to shape policy
reforms, thus making governments more accountable and re-
sponsive to local needs (Faguet et al. 2014; Lemos and
Agrawal 2006; Remmert 2016; Shackleton et al. 2002).
However, the extent to which decentralization increases local
participation in water governance depends heavily on the ca-
pacities of local actors (Faguet 2004a). Without the skills and
resources to engage with local government structures, com-
munity participation can quickly become tokenistic.
Even when it is decentralized, water management and gov-
ernance are necessarily situated within regional and national
institutional structures and processes that are regulated by oth-
er levels of government (Moss and Newig 2010; Vogel and
Henstra 2015). Therefore, to understand how local needs and
demands are constrained or enabled by the higher-level insti-
tutional processes in which they are embedded, local commu-
nity representatives require a good understanding of national
and regional water governance (Juhola and Westerhoff 2011).
Empowering local actors with an understanding of the multi-
scalar nature of water governance is a crucial aspect of helping
them identify areas of learning and opportunities for adaptive
governance at all levels (Pahl-Wostl 2009).
We use the concept of capacity to refer to the knowledge,
skills, and resources that individuals, institutions, and societies
can use to effectively perform functions and achieve objec-
tives (Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development) 2000;
UNDP 2007). Capacity building can be defined as processes
through which individuals, institutions, and societies obtain,
strengthen, and maintain their abilities to achieve their goals.
Defined in this way, capacity building for water governance
occurs when actors have access to the necessary funds, human
resources, knowledge, skills, and institutional support that en-
ables them to understand how water resources are managed at
different levels and that equips them to participate fully at the
appropriate level. In the face of climate change and water
scarcity, the capacity to design, implement, and constantly
adapt strategies to address water management problems is
increasingly critical (Pahl-Wostl 2009) but, so far, the devel-
opment of the capacities of local-level actors in this regard has
been insufficient (Wit and Stankiewicz 2006; Muller 2007).
In theory,WUAs andBMCs should be important entry points
for widening and deepening community voices in water
governance. Terry et al. (2015) unpack the role of WUAs in
Uganda and suggest that their effectiveness is limited by partic-
ipants having a poor understanding of their responsibilities. In
line with this, we suggest that decentralization in the water sector
should not only be about governments sharing responsibilities
with local actors but should also include enabling local actors to
take responsibility for managing water effectively (Helmsing
2002). Unless the capacity of local actors is strengthened, the
planning and management needed in relation to water resources
at the subnational level will continue to be problematic.
In this context, we explore what meaningful local
participation means, and how this creates an enabling environ-
ment for effective action linked to water governance.Many other
terms are used in the literature to describe this concept. We
follow the World Bank’s (1996) definition of participation as
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“a process through which stakeholders influence and share con-
trol over development initiatives, decisions, and resources which
affect them.” Participation can range from passive (for example,
being in a network that is informed about tariff-rate negotiations)
to active (for example, contributing to plans and implementing
decisions in a variety of ways). Following Arnstein’s (1969)
“ladder of participation,”we acknowledge that there are different
levels of involvement in decision-making and implementation
processes, from full engagement to tokenism, and that each level
can lead to different outcomes (see Bruns 2003; Carr et al. 2012;
Shackleton et al. 2002).
To count as empowerment, participation cannot just be about
validating decisions made elsewhere; it must include the ability
to influence decision-making processes and outcomes (Bossuyt
and Gould 2000). As opportunities for increased local participa-
tion have opened up, assumptions are often made that local peo-
ple, particularly thosewho are part of certain kinds of governance
structures (such as WPCs in Namibia), are taking part in water
governance. What remains unclear, however, is how effectively
such actors participate and what capacities and resources they
have to make their recommendations be heard. In this paper,
we address this gap by exploring (i) the nature of villagers’
involvement in water-related decision making (such as identify-
ing priorities for local water use); (ii) villagers’ access to institu-
tional, financial, and technical resources that might help them to
respond in well-informed ways; and (iii) some of the challenges
and opportunities villagers experience in relation to effective
governance of water resources.
Research context and methodologies
Decentralized water governance in Namibia
As in many other semi-arid regions, climate change is expected
to increase rainfall variability, as well as the incidence of extreme
events such as droughts and floods in Namibia (Muhangi and
Acidri 2008). This is addingmore pressure to an already-stressed
water sector and radically undermining ecosystem viability and
economic development (Kniveton and Todd 2006; Hughes et al.
2011; Ministry of Environment and Tourism 2011). As such,
Namibia’s water management practices and governance systems
urgently need strengthening.
Initiatives to decentralize water governance in Namibia began
in the early 1990s, soon after the country won its political inde-
pendence (Heyns 2005; Republic ofNamibia 1997; Schnegg and
Bollig 2016). The push for this reformwas motivated, in part, by
the fact that colonial water policy had excluded citizen participa-
tion and created unequal access to water resources (Republic of
Namibia 2000; Hossain and Helao 2008; Ministry of
Agricultural, Water and Rural Development – MAWRD
2000). As one of the driest countries in southern Africa, and
needing to address social inequalities, Namibia urgently needed
new forms of governance, including its water system. Against
this backdrop, the decentralization of functions and services was
considered the best means of ensuring a more effective and eq-
uitable distribution of water resources (Republic of Namibia
2010; Hossain and Helao 2008).
Consequently, in 1992, the Regional Councils Act and the
Local Authorities Act were introduced with the objective of in-
volving rural communities in the management of local water
resources. The Ministry of Agriculture Water and Forestry’s
Directorate of Water Supply and Sanitation Coordination
(DWSSC) was the appointed custodian of water resources and
made responsible for supplying rural communities in communal
areas with potable water (Republic of Namibia 2008). The
DWSSC is responsible for training extension officers and placing
them in communities to promote community-based water
management.
In 1997, the Namibia Water Corporation Act was passed
and, with that, the state-owned Namibia Water Corporation
(NamWater) was established tomanage bulk water supplies in
collaboration with the Department of Rural Water Supply
(Republic of Namibia 2008). Communal standpipes were
installed for rural communities. WUAs (for users of particular
water points) were established and WPCs were elected to
govern these water points on behalf of the WUAs (see
Hossain and Helao 2008; Schnegg et al. 2016). Similarly,
pipeline schemes, via which several water points and private
off-takes are connected, are managed by local WPCs. WPCs
coordinate the management and maintenance of water points
or pipeline schemes and facilitate the payment of user fees to
NamWater (Schnegg and Linke 2016).WPCs can also request
technical support from DWSSC for maintenance and repairs.
Handing over the management and maintenance of water
points to local WPCs has proven problematic. Made up of
local householders, few WPCs have the capacity to monitor
and maintain water points. In addition, some village residents
cannot afford the water fees. This puts WPCs in the awkward
position of having to demand payments from their neighbors.
If they fail to collect, NamWater can shut off the water points
(Hossain and Helao 2008). This forces poorer households and
communities to revert to using unsafe water sources including
dams, open canals, and hand-dug wells.
Methodology
The research reported here was conducted as part of the
Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid Regions (ASSAR) research
project, which ran from 2014 to 2018 and aimed to deepen
understandings of adaptation governance in semi-arid regions
in Africa and Asia. In Namibia, the Omusati Region (see
Fig. 1) was selected to represent a semi-arid region where
communities are particularly vulnerable to the likely impacts
of climate change and where pressure on water resources is
growing (Bollig et al. 2013). As yet, water-resource
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management challenges in such regions are relatively unex-
plored empirically with the exception of few studies such as
those by Hossain and Helao (2008) and Schnegg and Bollig
(2016).
Given the multi-scalar lens that guided the ASSAR project,
our research focused on actors, resources, and institutional ar-
rangements at the village, constituency, and regional levels.
Capturing the details of decision-making processes across these
different levels helped us understand the complexities and capac-
ity challenges involved in governance from the perspectives of a
range of actors from local to sub-national levels (Eakin 2006).
In 2014, we began by analyzing secondary data1 to inform
our research focus and help in the refining of research ques-
tions. This was accompanied by an extensive review of key
domestic water management practices, policies, strategies,
and governance structures in Namibia. Between 2015 and
2017, 24 key informants were interviewed about their organi-
zations’ roles, influence, and capacities in decision-making
processes linked to water governance. They included various
state and non-state actors involved in water management at the
national, sub-national (Omusati Region), and local level
(Onesi Constituency). Some of the organizations represented
include NamWater, the Olushandja Basin Management
Committee, the Directorate of Water Resource Management,
the DWSSC, the regional Disaster Risk Management
Committee, the Omusati Regional Council, the Onesi
Constituency Office, the local Traditional Authority, and local
WPCs. All informants were purposefully selected to include
actors who have experience in water governance across scales
in the region and who were willing to explore this with us via
semi-structured interviews.
After the interviews, fieldwork was undertaken at the village
level in 2017. In consultation with traditional authorities and the
Onesi constituency office, criteria were developed to select case-
study villages. Criteria included relative distance from the con-
stituency office to determine the degree of participation in local
governance, the presence or absence of influential leaders or
champions who influence local action, and the presence or ab-
sence of community-led water management initiatives.
Consequently, we selected three villages which showed different
levels of involvement in water-resource management, ranging
from Enongo, where people are more engaged, to Olwaadhiya,
and Eenkalashe where they are less engaged. Livelihoods across
the area are precarious, with most people relying on subsistence
farming (rain-fed crops and livestock). Low and increasingly
unpredictable rainfall is increasing the pressure on existing water
resources (Bollig et al. 2013).
At the village level, focus groups were held to explore
resident’s views on water governance, (see Annex 1 for more
details on participatory methods and focus group activities).
Each focus group had almost equal numbers of men and wom-
en. A total of 28 individuals participated: six males and four
females from Enongo, three males and three females from
Eenkalashe, and six males and six females from Olwaadhiya.
The interviews and focus group discussions were tran-
scribed and coded using computer software (NVivo 11) and
then analyzed using a thematic approach (see Braun and
Fig. 1 Location of the research
site in the Omusati Region of
north-central Namibia
1 In a summary report of this research, Spear et al. (2015) review the existing
literature on contextual vulnerabilities in the ASSAR case-study areas.
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Clarke 2006). The main themes under which the data was
examined include multi-scalar perspectives on water gover-
nance, local participation, and capacities for engaging in water
governance.
Capacity challenges at the local level
In this section, we first outline the ways in which local actors
have participated in decentralized water governance. We then
discuss the capacities of local actors to act, describe how re-
sponsibilities are divided, and highlight institutional capacities
and financial resources available at the local level. We place
this in the context of coordination across scales in an attempt
to situate local challenges within the context of the decentral-
ization of water governance.
Nature and degree of participation at the local level
In this research, participation in local water governance pri-
marily takes the form of involvement in decision-making
around priorities for local water use and allocation, providing
input on issues such as tariff structures and user fees, and
engagement in the ongoing operation, management, and
maintenance of water facilities.
Results from the three villages in Onesi reveal that the
nature and degree of participation in the management of water
services vary significantly across different social groups. With
regard to planning for local water use, the majority of partic-
ipants from all three villages said they had never participated
in identifying priorities for water use and allocation in their
villages. Very few villagers, other than those who held posi-
tions in the village, including the village headmen/women or
their assistants, had participated in any decision making.
Moreover, the involvement of village leaders depended on
the presence of associated governance structures, such as
WPAs and constituency development committees, or their
own individual networks and relationships with other tradi-
tional leadership structures.2 The fact that social and individ-
ual positions were a key determinant of participation high-
lights the exclusion of those who are not well networked and
those located lower in the social strata, including the poor and
marginalized.
Influencing outcomes across levels
While decentralization creates significant potential for en-
hancing local participation, it does not automatically empower
villagers to influence the outcomes of water reforms. In
Namibia, although WPCs foster greater inclusion for local
communities, their participation is often tokenistic. Very few
villagers make suggestions or affect outcomes. Most infor-
mants pointed to the limited knowledge and resources they
have, explaining that they are unaware of what lines of com-
munication to use to raise their water concerns. They also
stated that their opportunities to meet with WPC members or
other influential people to discuss their concerns are limited.
As one participant put it:
There’s no one I can go to even if I had a suggestion.
Given these constraints, the extent to which local actors
influence outcomes is limited. Their involvement tends to de-
pend on whether local leaders, who act as “gatekeepers,” are
willing to take their concerns to higher levels.
In Namibia, the traditional authorities can play an impor-
tant role in enhancing inclusion and representation if they
listen to communities and bring their concerns to the constit-
uency and regional decision-making forums. In Enongo vil-
lage, the headman is a member of the Traditional Authority.
So, if someone there has a concern, they either speak to the
councilor, or directly to the Traditional Authority, which then
communicates with the relevant government authority.
Villagers see the traditional authorities as important gover-
nance structures that articulate and represent the needs of the
local community. As one constituency-level respondent
observed:
If they [local community] see something wrong within their
communities they just go and report to traditional authority …
That is an indication that there’s a good relation … if you see
people just jumping to regional council or further up you will
know we do not have a good relationship with our people here.
Where gatekeepers are strong and supportive of local peo-
ple’s priorities, the water reforms have had relatively positive
outcomes. However, where gatekeepers prefer to maintain the
status quo, transformation can be blocked. In Onesi, a large
number of participants said that they “don’t see the benefit of
being part of decision making” and “don’t see any incentives
to do so”, and hence, they “prefer to leave decisions to the
most influential people”. One respondent told us:
I attended a meeting and suggested (the government
excavate the dam) … but then the local leader refused
and say, “no the government does not have money.”
To sum up, local leaders can either facilitate or hinder par-
ticipation. Where leaders understand the needs of their people
and are willing to be supportive, as in Enongo, the leader acts
as a catalyst for local participation. The problem with this is
that such gatekeepers do not always speak on behalf of those
they represent. Mapping villages according to how traditional
leaders engage with villagers, and use their influence at higher
levels of decision making, is one way to begin to understand
the varying extents to which local concerns are addressed
across levels (Udensi et al. 2012).
2 These traditional structures are based on the ethnic affiliations of the indig-
enous people of the territory.
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Capacity of local actors to participate in water
governance
As mentioned, WPCs coordinate the operation and maintenance
of water points and are responsible for collecting user fees. In line
with decentralization, local residents are expected to formulate
their own rules regarding how to share the costs and benefits of
the water points and the WPCs then take responsibility for
implementing the rules. Thus, the WPCs are considered to be
in charge of water points on behalf of communities, but few of
them have the financial, technical, or managerial capacity to
undertake these responsibilities effectively.
According to committee members during a focus group dis-
cussion, user fees collected by WPCs are paid to NamWater to
recover the cost of water use. From this amount, the WPCs re-
ceive a small annual membership fee (each water point user pays
an equivalent of US$3.53 per year) which means the funds avail-
able to cover operational and maintenance costs are inadequate.
This assumes that committeemembers will be willing to carry out
operational activities, such as opening the tap at specific times and
collecting user fees, on a voluntary basis. Unsurprisingly, one of
the challenges committee members identified during a focus
group discussion is maintaining a balance between volunteering
forWPCwork and carrying out other livelihood activities such as
farming. In many villages, committee members said they had
been unable to juggle these roles, with some deciding to go on
strike and cease attending to their responsibilities. This then led to
the closure of some communal water points. As one regional
member of the DWSSC explained:
As we speak, the local WPCs are on a strike. The
community-based water management speaks of volunta-
rism. The Committee should volunteer themselves, in
terms of chairing the meeting, taking notes and collecting
money from various WUAs … and paying it to
NamWater. People started complaining that they cannot
be doing voluntary work for government and NamWater.
Lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities and
limited platforms for coordination
Limited coordination between the national, regional, and local
government, as well as a lack of clarity on their respective roles
and responsibilities, constrains effective participation. Thus, while
policy frameworks support decentralized decision making by
multiple actors in the water sector, the functions of the various
institutions overlap in ways that make their governance roles
unclear and therefore challenging to manage. Accordingly,
regional-level actors we interviewed highlighted the challenges
of supplying water and maintaining infrastructure. While
NamWater is responsible for supplying water to the water points,
the construction and maintenance of water infrastructure—
including water points, pipelines, and boreholes—falls under the
DWSSC. However, the regional government is also responsible
for supplying water to rural communities. At constituency level,
WPCs report to the DWSSC’s regional offices when major re-
pairs andmaintenance are needed, but all fees for water consump-
tion collected by WPCs are paid to NamWater, which sets its
tariffs on a cost-recovery basis.
Overlapping functions and the unclear division of respon-
sibilities means that holding the authorities accountable for
repairs is difficult. One regional-level respondent explained:
AlthoughWPCs are a part of theWater Act, some national-
level stakeholders do not see the need of having WPCs…
so now they are even revisiting the Water Act trying to
check how these WPCs are going to fit in … and if they
decide to keep them, then who is going to pay them? This
thing is now between the government and NamWater: the
government is saying NamWater is the main supplier of
water, hence they have to pay those people because the user
fees goes to NamWater. Then NamWater is saying, ‘I am
not the one who put those people there, why should I pay
somebody who is not in my system?’
Villagers mirrored these concerns, arguing that the lack of
proper lines of communication and coordination between the
relevant actors inhibits their participation in water governance.
Among the issues villagers raised was the fact that they have
no input on the setting of water tariffs. Unfortunately,
NamWater seldom engages with communities. As one region-
al Water Artisanal Officer explained:
NamWater do not work directly with WPCs … we do
not have direct meetings with the local community. We
would like to have direct meetings but we cannot be-
cause of limited numbers of staff.
This points to a disjuncture between policy objectives and
intentions and the ability of local, regional and national actors
to support these intentions in practice. Although local water
users are, in theory, expected to be central to water gover-
nance, the government does not have sufficient capacity or
resources to engage with the many WPCs that now exist
throughout the country. In addition, insufficient attention has
been paid to enabling village representatives to engage with
actors at the constituency and regional levels.
Regional decision making
According to actors working at the regional level, centralized
decision making and national priority setting still prevail in3 As per currency values on 27 August 2018.
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Namibia’s water sector. It is not only villagers and constitu-
ency actors who struggle to engage in decision making; even
regional actors feel that they are not involved in setting the
priorities that are enforced by the national government. Many
respondents described how regional decisions often have to
wait for funding sign-off at the national level. They explained
that this slows down operations and impacts on their ability to
act at a regional level. In essence, decentralization has been
only partially implemented, and this challenges the apparent
autonomy of several structures. When asked if the regional
government has enough power to implement the decisions
they make, a representative from DWSSC said:
We only have one government and we have regions. So,
anything you do at the regional level you are still ac-
countable to the national level … We have different
ministries within the regions but they are still having
their supervisors at the head office where the budget
and other things are being debated through the [national]
minister. In the end … they give you this money [to]
work on this project; that’s how we are.
Part of supporting participation at regional and village level
requires understanding the extent to which local actors can
exercise influence and control over decisions that affect them
and the responses they receive when they express dissatisfac-
tion with service delivery (Narayan 1999). Unfortunately, giv-
en the limited power available to actors at the regional level, it
is not surprising village level involvement is limited too. For
community participation to be effective, modes of engage-
ment have to move beyond consultation to more substantive
forms of influence over policy implementation. This is diffi-
cult to achieve when decentralization is only partially effected,
as is the case with water governance in Namibia.
Financial capacity to support action at the regional
and local levels
Despite the fact that progress has been made to establish in-
stitutional structures at regional and village levels, funding
remains a major constraint. There is a mismatch between
funding allocations and administrative responsibilities at the
regional and local levels. Both regional and local actors cited a
lack of funds as the major impediment to effective water gov-
ernance and noted that the DWSSC is unable to execute major
repairs promptly because they lack the necessary funds. The
BMCs also attributed their inability to holdmeetings and carry
out basin management and visits to local communities to sim-
ilar constraints. One respondent noted the following:
Funding is one of the problems. If, you [want] to work
with the communities, you do not need to allow them to
stay for too long without visiting them. If you make
follow-up- meetings, the flow of information will con-
tinue. But if you only go there after a year… you do not
expect these people to remember what you told them. So
that is one of the main preventing factors.
This shows the importance of making basic funding avail-
able to ensure that meetings can occur often enough to allow
the relationships and channels that help local governance to
function effectively to be built. With little or no face-to-face
contact between actors at the regional and village level, it is
not surprising that villagers do not know who to approach
with their concerns.
We were also told that the training of WPC members in
record keeping, cost management, and the carrying out of
minor repairs tended to be very selective and, in many cases,
was given to villagers who were already quite active and
knowledgeable and who were easily able to find opportunities
outside the village leaving behind less literate villagers who
tend to have little knowledge of how to manage the WPs.
In addition, the lack of incentives to support villagers’ par-
ticipation in WPCs has been a major obstacle to the effective
management and administration of the water points.
According to one regional-level actor:
We are in the process of setting up a way to remove
water points. Because we have the water point where
everybody has to come and get water. But you find the
person who is responsible to open the tap at 10 am, went
to town. Right now, the WPCs are not working at all.
They are on strike … because they want to be paid.
The argument here is that insufficient funding undermines
effective participation in water governance at the local level.
For example, participants in focus group discussions attribut-
ed the defaulting of user payments and the closure of water
points to the challenges of collecting payments when local
WPCs go on strike. Due to strikes, WPCs and private off-
takers do meter readings and then visit the DWSSC regional
office in Outapi which assist in calculating payments’ due.
However, the failure to pay bills in time has led NamWater
to close water points. For this reason, regional actors are in-
creasingly supporting a move away from communal water
points to private off-takers.
Despite the fact that there is no institutional support for this
move to private off-takes, those households that can afford it
are increasingly opting for private off-takes. While a private
off-takemakes it relatively easy for higher-income households
to manage payment and access water, if communal water
points are not maintained, those who cannot afford to install
private taps (which cost about US$84)5 and pay for water use
will have less (or no) access to potable water. So, although
local actors are expected to carry certain responsibilities as
part of the shift towards decentralization, if communities do
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not feel that their participation is valued or supported, they
refuse to cooperate, creating potentially negative impacts for
many villagers.
Discussion
Different levels and types of participation lead to
different outcomes
Participation is widely seen as a central tenet of decentraliza-
tion and as critical to achieving efficiency, equity, and the
effective management of decentralized water resources
(Adhikari and Tarkowski 2013; Agrawal and Ribot 1999;
Enserink et al. 2007; Iribarnegaray and Seghezzo 2012;
Neef 2009). Participation is also often cited as a means of
ensuring that policies and programs are responsive to local
needs, based on the view that involved communities can more
easily raise their concerns (Faguet 2004a, b, 2012). In some
situations, by bringing the government closer to people, par-
ticipation can lead citizens to a deeper understanding of key
issues and help them make better-informed decisions (Pahl-
Wostl 2002).
Adhikari and Tarkowski (2013) have shown how BMCs
and WUAs in India contribute to more effective water man-
agement and have enhanced local actors’ participation in wa-
ter reforms. Similarly, studies in two African countries:
Ferguson and Mulwafu (2001) in Malawi and Terry et al.
(2015) in Uganda—indicate that decentralization has widened
and extended participation in water governance. Our own
findings show that the participation of local actors in water
governance has increased where WUAs and WPCs are fully
functional. Here, community members do take responsibility
for the daily operation of their water point including opening
the tap and for collecting fees for water consumption and
maintenance. However, the ability of WPCs to facilitate more
active participation of the members has been poor so far, part-
ly because of their very limited resources. Although the prin-
ciple that if users pay for water resources, they value them
more is not disputed; in the villages we studied, user fees are
impacting on water access. As poorer and more marginalized
householders cannot afford to pay for water, they are increas-
ingly excluded from accessing safe water and have little op-
tion but to revert to hand-dug wells and poorer quality water
sources. Yet, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals,
it is precisely the voices and needs of the marginalized that
need to be heard if truly equitable access is to be achieved.
Without support for local participation, the benefits
of decentralization remain limited
Despite local groups managing the day-to-day supply of water
in rural Namibia, the success of these decentralized
arrangements depend on the resources and capacities of actors
involved in the system across levels. In particular, constituen-
cy and regional actors who are expected to support the local
villages have limited capacities and resources. Evidence from
this study suggests that, in Namibia, decentralized water gov-
ernance has enabled the central government to delegate re-
sponsibilities to local authorities and village members.
However, this has not been matched with the resources and
capacity building needed to empower those at the local level.
Consequently, some aspects of water governance remain
centralized, thus reducing the authority of officials at the re-
gional level to make critical decisions and delaying action on
important issues affecting water point operation and local par-
ticipation. For instance, because of resource and staff con-
straints, DWSSC has been unable to prioritize the installation
of new water points. Similarly, the performance of BMCs in
enhancing community engagement has been poor. From a
governance point of view, this is an indication of limited au-
tonomy and authority over issues at the local level, despite
government rhetoric that bottom-up participation in water
management will be supported (see Faguet et al. 2014). Our
findings confirm an observation made by Wunsch (2001) that
the failure of decentralized reforms in Africa is often the result
of a limited allocation of resources at the local level.
Attention needs to be paid to who is able to
participate
Although the decentralization of water governance can poten-
tially improve service delivery and equity (Mansuri and Rao
2013), little work has been done on how decentralization has
impacted different social groups. There is some evidence that,
while participatory processes generally aim for more inclu-
sion, in reality, “participatory exclusions” exclude significant
groups of people, particularly the poor and marginalized
(Agarwal 2001). This suggests that attention must be paid
not only to the mechanisms of participation, but also to how
social differentiation works to select who is included or
excluded.
The extent to which poor and marginalized households are
part of decision-making processes seems to be limited in
Namibia. Our case study reveals that for reform to be successful,
social differentiation cannot be overlooked. Although the policy
intention was to include all community members through
WUAs, existing forms of social differentiation in Namibian vil-
lages created unequal terms of participation. WUA membership
rules exclude those who cannot pay user fees, thereby automat-
ically preventing poorer households from taking part in local
water governance. In addition, responsibilities currently allocated
to villagers focus on operational matters and the collection of
payments; they have no space to challenge or change how the
WUAs and WPCs function. This has led to such frustration that
some WPCs have opted to abandon their operational
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responsibilities. Faced with highly uncertain water supplies,
many better-off households stopped using the communal water
points and installed taps in their homes instead. This leaves poor
households, who cannot afford to install their own private taps, at
risk. Since, the capacities and resources available to different
actors vary significantly from one social group to the other, the
potential for decentralization to benefit households differs even
within the same community. If this is not recognized and planned
for, inequality in relation to access to water services is highly
likely.
Conclusion
This research has shown that for actors to carry out their re-
sponsibilities and participate effectively in water governance,
they require appropriate knowledge and resources (Table 1
provides a summary factors enabling and constraining local
participation). As has been seen in the outcomes of decentral-
ization processes across Africa (Oosterveer and Van Vliet
2010; Terry et al. 2015), when the capacities of actors are
not carefully assessed and provided for, reforms have a high
chance of failing or not delivering the intended outcome.
When aiming to increase local governance of water services,
more attention should be paid to differential impacts of the pro-
posed shift on different social groups. Decentralization, increased
participation, and equity are not linear processes that automati-
cally create equal outcomes for all. This study confirms that
increasing community participation does not necessarily trans-
form existing power dynamics or assist poor and marginalized
communities to meet their needs (Agarwal 2001). Tools such as
stakeholder mapping can be helpful in identifying which actors
have stakes in the system, and what types of integrated planning
might be appropriate to achieving effective and equitable water
governance (Reed et al. 2009).
One of the key objectives of widening citizen participation in
the delivery of infrastructure services is to incorporate local
knowledge and experiences into decision-making (Ziervogel
et al. 2016). Increasingly, the urgent need for communities to
adapt to climate change is also highlighting the need for local
participation in decision making (Lemos and Agrawal 2006;
Naess 2013). Where lessons need to be learned is how to more
effectively support local participation in order to build adaptive
capacity for climate change, as well as for water and resource
management more broadly.
Although widening participation can increase the effective-
ness of water governance, tensions that can arise around the
transfer of responsibilities to the local level should be antici-
pated and managed. Processes linked to payments for water
services must be carefully thought through, particularly where
poverty levels are high. Similarly, it should be acknowledged
that many local actors do not have sufficient knowledge or
resources to take responsibility for maintaining water infra-
structure and services. From the perspective of rural villagers
in Namibia, reforms linked to decentralization appear have
been more about taking part of the service-delivery workload
off government hands and leaving the poorest of villagers to
shoulder more burdens.
More focus is needed on understanding governance gaps
and ensuring coordinated efforts to deliver the expected out-
comes, especially when multi-scalar systems are involved
(Nalau et al. 2015). This may require increased involvement
of regional and local actors in policymaking, alongside defin-
ing clear roles and responsibilities at each level of governance.
This could enhance the capacity for effective participation and
help to make local government more responsive to local
needs. In this regard, fostering capacity building at all levels,
as well as inclusive approaches through public participation
and engagement, should be key drivers towards achieving the
goals of decentralized water reforms.
Table 1 Factors that enable and
constrain local participation in
water governance in northern
Namibia
Factors enabling participation Factors constraining participation
Access to resources that allow villagers to respond in
the desired way
Lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities
Enabling institutional structures such as water point
committee and tribal authorities
Limited platforms for coordination across scales
Social strata and individual networks with other
actors
Limited power at the regional level
Technical resources and knowledge around water
infrastructure
Centralized decision making and national priority setting
Strong and supportive leaders that enable
participation between the village and constituent
level
Lack of human resources including limited managerial
and technical resources to undertake decentralized
responsibilities
Local leaders that act as gatekeepers that take
village concerns to the constituent or regional
level
Insufficient funding for organizing meetings and
enabling travel
Limited opportunities to discuss concerns around water
governance
Volunteer nature of water point committee operations
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Although decentralization presupposes that water gover-
nance will become more inclusive and participatory for local
communities, few of the expected benefits have materialized
in the Namibian villages studied. More research is needed to
understand if decentralized water governance has delivered
more benefits elsewhere, and the extent to which local actors
are participating meaningfully. Either decentralization has to
be reconsidered in terms of how it might deliver benefits at the
local level or more attention must be placed on both the insti-
tutional structures and the resources available to enable local
actors to participate more effectively.
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